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Abstract
Historically, machine learning methods have not been designed with security in
mind. In turn, this has given rise to adversarial examples, carefully perturbed input
samples aimed to mislead detection at test time, which have been applied to attack
spam and malware classification (Dalvi et al., 2004; Lowd & Meek, 2005a,b), and
more recently to attack image classification (Szegedy et al., 2013). Consequently,
an abundance of research has been devoted to designing machine learning methods
that are robust to adversarial examples. Unfortunately, there are desiderata besides
robustness that a secure and safe machine learning model must satisfy, such as
fairness and privacy. Recent work by Song et al. (2019) has shown, empirically,
that there exists a trade-off between robust and private machine learning models.
Models designed to be robust to adversarial examples often overfit on training
data to a larger extent than standard (non-robust) models. If a dataset contains
private information, then any statistical test that separates training and test data by
observing a model’s outputs can represent a privacy breach, and if a model overfits
on training data, these statistical tests become easier. The inversely proportional
relationship between privacy and overfitting has been well documented in previous
works (Yeom et al., 2018; Rice et al., 2020).
In this work, we identify settings where standard models will provably overfit
to a larger extent in comparison to robust models, and as empirically observed
in previous works, settings where the opposite behavior occurs. Thus, it is not
necessarily the case that privacy must be sacrificed to achieve robustness. The
degree of overfitting naturally depends on the amount of data available for training.
We go on to formally characterize how the training set size factors into the privacy
risks exposed by training a robust model. Finally, we empirically show our findings
hold on image classification benchmark datasets, such as CIFAR-10.
1 Introduction
Overfitting is the enemy of generalization – a fundamental property of any useful machine learning
model. If a model overfits on its training data, it is invariably more confident in its predictions on these
inputs. Statistical tests can then be used to discriminate between a models behavior on the training
set and test set, and if inclusion of an input in the training set is in some way sensitive, this can cause
a privacy violation. Recently, Song et al. (2019) have shown that securing models against adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio & Roli, 2018) can exacerbate this privacy issue. This is demon-
strated in fig. 1: we train a ResNet-18 classifier (He et al., 2016) on the CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky
et al., 2009) using standard gradient descent (resulting in a standard model), and via adversarial
training (resulting in a robust model) using either the FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) or PGD (Madry
et al., 2017) attack (see section 5 for full details). We then exploit overconfidence in the model’s
predictions to determine if an input belongs to the training set or the test set, where we select a random
subset of the CIFAR-10 training set that is equal in size to the test set to determine membership.
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Figure 1: Membership accuracy of standard and
robust classifiers on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We
measure the accuracy in determining if an input
belongs to the test set or a subset of the training
set that is of equal size. The baseline membership
accuracy is therefore 50%.
We plot the membership accuracy – the accu-
racy of determining if an input belongs to the
training set or test set, and note that this is al-
ways higher on an adversarially robust trained
model in comparison to a standard model. We
note that the results in fig. 1 are not state-of-
the-art – the exact attack method used here to
determine membership is largely unimportant,
what is important is the disparate vulnerabil-
ity to membership attacks between a standard
model and an adversarially robust model.
Following work by Sablayrolles et al. (2019), we
show that vulnerability to membership attacks is
proportional to the expected gap between train-
ing and test loss, which we refer to as the loss
gap. In other words, the loss gap corresponds
to how much the model overfits. In contrast to
empirical work (Song et al., 2019), that shows
overfitting is almost always exacerbated by adversarial training, we prove in a simple data setting,
adversarial training can either increase or decrease the risk of membership attacks, because the
expected loss gap can increase or decrease. We show that the precise cases where adversarially robust
training has a smaller or larger loss gap in comparison to standard training, depends on the size of
perturbation used in adversarial training, , and the size of the training set. After presenting this
characterization in a simple data setting, we empirically demonstrate this privacy-robustness trade-off
(or lack thereof) exists in more complex datasets, such as CIFAR-10.
In sum, we make the following contributions:
1. We prove that robust models (through adversarial training) can be more private than standard
models. Additionally, we present settings where the opposite behavior occurs; robust models
are provably less private than their standard counterparts.
2. We show that vulnerability to membership attacks depends on the size of the perturbation
used in adversarial training and the size of the training set.
3. We empirically show these relationships hold on complex image datasets such as CIFAR-10.
2 Background
The most relevant works to our own come from Song et al. (2019) and Rice et al. (2020). Song et al.
(2019) led an empirical evaluation of the privacy risks that are exacerbated by training models to
be robust to adversarial examples. Firstly, they introduce a new membership attack that delineates
between training and test inputs based on the adversarial loss (the loss on adversarial examples)
rather than standard loss. They then show membership accuracy is higher on robust models than
on standard models, and this is true regardless of if the attack uses the standard or adversarial loss
to predict membership. The specific method used to create a robust model does not reduce the
disparate membership vulnerability between robust and standard models; Song et al. (2019) show an
increase in membership attack accuracy over a standard model, when the robust model is constructed
using adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017), or using a certified adversarial example defense that
guarantees robustness around an -ball on training inputs (Gowal et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018;
Wong & Kolter, 2017). The intuition as to why robust models are more susceptible to privacy attacks
goes as follows – robust models are trained to be insensitive to perturbations around their training
inputs, but by doing so, they are made more sensitive to the choice of training inputs, because the
invariance to perturbations within an -ball around a training input does not completely generalize to
test inputs. Inspired by Song et al. (2019), our work seeks to answer the following questions: Is it
always the case that robust models reduce privacy, or are there cases where robust models are also
more private? How does the training set size factor into the level of privacy of a model?
Rice et al. (2020) show that robust overfitting is a concern in robust models. The gap between
standard train and test error is smaller than the gap between robust train and test error – where
we define robust error as the worst-case error within an -ball around the inputs. However, they
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show that robust overfitting can be mitigated by simple defenses such as early stopping. Yeom et al.
(2018) formally analyze the connection between overfitting and privacy, and find that overfitting is
sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership attacks, and additionally, attribute inference
attacks (Fredrikson et al., 2014, 2015; Wu et al., 2016). In light of work by Yeom et al. (2018), our
findings on the connection between membership attacks and overfitting is not entirely novel, but
we transcribe this connection into the membership attack language introduced by Sablayrolles et al.
(2019), who propose a Bayes optimal membership attack and demonstrate state-of-the-art results on
common image dataset benchmarks.
The privacy risks of overfitting have also been exposed by Carlini et al. (2019), where they show that
it is possible to extract sensitive information from the training set simply by querying the trained
model. Using an attack based on log-perplexity of a model’s output, they show it is possible to
extract secrets in language based models such as credit card information. Pan et al. (2018) and Song
& Raghunathan (2020) have recently investigated the privacy risks of memorization in powerful
language models such as GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019) and BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), finding that
text embeddings from these models capture a lot sensitive information about the plain text inputs.
To the best of our knowledge, the work of Homer et al. (2008) was the first to highlight a privacy
risk from inferring general dataset statistics. Specifically, they infer the presence of genomes within
a dataset by comparing with published statistics about this dataset, and this was further studied
in Dwork et al. (2015) and Backes et al. (2016). As far we are aware, the first work to specifically
target membership inference of single inputs was Shokri et al. (2017). By training shadow models
that learn the distribution of outputs of a target model, they show it is possible to infer membership
of inputs on common image datasets (MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky
et al., 2009)) and tabular data (ADULT dataset (Kohavi, 1996)). Sablayrolles et al. (2019) then went
on to show, under limited assumptions, black-box membership attacks are equivalent to white-box
membership attacks. That is, they show that the Bayes optimal membership attack only inspects the
loss of an input, and so devising a membership attack that can inspect internal parameters of a model
should perform no better. However, in practice, white-box membership attacks have been shown
by Nasr et al. (2018) to outperform black-box membership attacks. Differential privacy (Dwork
et al., 2006) has been touted as a potential remedy to privacy attacks (Carlini et al., 2019). However,
recent work by Bagdasaryan et al. (2019) has shown that differentially private models have their
own problems – differential privacy often increases average test error, however poorly represented
subpopulations in the data distribution incur a much larger increase in test error, which in turn cases
fairness concerns.
In an orthogonal direction to our work on privacy, (Raghunathan et al., 2019, 2020; Chen et al.,
2020; Min et al., 2020; Nakkiran, 2019; Schmidt et al., 2018; Tsipras et al., 2018a,b; Zhang et al.,
2019; Dohmatob, 2018; Carmon et al., 2019; Najafi et al., 2019; Uesato et al., 2018) have all studied
trade-offs between generalization error and robustness to adversarial examples.
3 Membership inference and overfitting
We follow the same set-up as introduced by Sablayrolles et al. (2019). LetX×Y be a data distribution,
from which we sample n ∈ N training points (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ X ×Y . Given a machine learn-
ing model, fθ, a training procedure selects parameters, θ, solving arg minθ
1
n
∑n
i=1 `(fθ(xi), yi),
where `(fθ(·), ·) is a loss function that incurs a large cost when fθ(x) 6= y, and a small cost when
fθ(x) = y. We assume the posterior distribution follows
P
(
fθ | (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)
) ∝ e−∑ni=1 `(fθ(xi),yi) (1)
Given a machine learning model, fθ, a membership inference attack attempts to exploit memorization
within θ to infer if an input x ∈ X belongs to the training set. Sablayrolles et al. (2019) formalizes
this by defining binary membership variables, m1, . . . ,mn, where mi = 0 for test inputs, mi = 1 for
training inputs, and the probability of membership is fixed, P (mi = 1) = λ. Then, eq. (1) becomes
P
(
fθ | (x1, y1,m1), . . . , (xn, yn,mn)
) ∝ e−∑ni=1mi`(fθ(xi),yi) (2)
Formally, a membership attack on a sample, (x, y), aims to compute the following:
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Definition 3.1. (Sablayrolles et al., 2019) Membership inference of (x, y) ∈ X × Y amounts to
computing:
M(fθ, x, y) := P
(
m = 1 | fθ, x, y
)
(3)
Under definition 3.1, Sablayrolles et al. (2019) proved that:
M(fθ, x, y) ∝ τ(x, y)− `(fθ, x, y) (4)
where τ(x, y) = − log ( ∫
ω
e−`(fω,x,y)p(fω)dω
)
, and can be viewed as a calibration threshold, to
which the loss is compared in an attack.
Using this, we can define a measure of how much (x1, y1) leaks about membership in comparison to
a reference input, (x2, y2):
Definition 3.2. Measuring how much (x1, y1) leaks about membership in comparison to (x2, y2)
amounts to computing:
Mc(fθ, x1, y1, x2, y2) := P
(
m1 = 1 | fθ, x1, y1
)− P (m2 = 1 | fθ, x2, y2) (5)
Clearly if |Mc| = 1, membership information is leaked by only one input, andMc = 0 implies the
membership information leaked by (x1, y1) is identical to the membership information leaked by
(x2, y2). From eq. (4), we have the following relation:
Mc(fθ, x1, y1, x2, y2) ∝ `(fθ, x2, y2)− τ(x2, y2) + τ(x1, y1)− `(fθ, x1, y1) (6)
Let Dtr,Dte ⊆ X × Y denote training and test sets of equal size n ∈ N, respectively. Furthermore,
let (x, y) ∈ Dtr and (x∗, y∗) ∈ Dte, with associated membership variables m and m∗ satisfying
P (m = 1) and P (m∗ = 0). We can measure the average comparative membership information that
can inferred from a training set input in comparison to a reference test set input by computing the
following:
E
(x,y)∈Dtr
(x∗,y∗)∈Dte
[
`(fθ, x
∗, y∗)− τ(x∗, y∗) + τ(x, y)− `(fθ, x, y)
]
(7)
As in Sablayrolles et al. (2019), we make the assumption that ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y , τ(x, y) = τ , for
some constant value τ . This reduces eq. (7) to:
E
(x,y)∈Dtr
(x∗,y∗)∈Dte
[
`(fθ, x
∗, y∗)− `(fθ, x, y)
]
(8)
Of course, no information is lost when dividing by a constant and so the membership information
leaked by the entire training set in comparison to an equally sized reference test set is found by
computing:
E
(x,y)∈Dtr
(x∗,y∗)∈Dte
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
`(fθ, x
∗
i , y
∗
i )− `(fθ, xi, yi)
)]
(9)
A large absolute value in eq. (9) indicates a severe miscalibration between expected loss on the
training and test sets, and so in turn, implies membership information is leaked by the training set.
Clearly, eq. (9), is equal to the expected loss gap defined in section 1, and is exactly the value we
should measure to infer if a model has overfitted on Dtr.
We have used the terminology set out by Sablayrolles et al. (2019) to delineate the connection between
overfitting and membership inference. In the following section, we show in a simple setting that
adversarial training can provably increase or decrease the risk of overfitting in comparison to standard
training. We show how this deficit or excess risk is governed by the size of perturbation used in
adversarial training, and the size of training set.
4
4 Adversarial training can provably increase or decrease overfitting
In this section, we identify settings where adversarial training min has a provably larger loss gap in
comparison to standard training, for any finitely sized training set. Similarly, we identify settings
where adversarial training has a provably smaller loss gap in comparison to standard training, for any
finitely sized training set. Previous work on the connection between adversarial training and privacy
has shown that, empirically, adversarial training increases the efficacy of membership attacks and
so, robustness comes at the expense of privacy. In this section, we prove that there exists settings
where this trade-off does not exist; one can train a robust model through adversarial training and
simultaneously enjoy more privacy in comparison to a standard model.
Let x ∈ Rd, where ∀j ∈ [d], xj ∼ N (yµ, σ2), µ > 0, σ > 0, and y ∼ {±1} uniformly at random.
We study this data model setting under the linear loss function `(fθ(x), y) = −y〈θ, x〉, where the
decision rule is given by Fθ(x) = sign(fθ(x)) = sign(〈θ, x〉). We note that robustness properties of
a linear classifier optimized with a linear loss or similar variants under Gaussian data have recently
been studied by (Chen et al., 2020; Min et al., 2020; Yin et al., 2018; Tsipras et al., 2018a; Schmidt
et al., 2018; Nakkiran, 2019; Khim & Loh, 2018) 1.
In standard and robust empirical risk minimization we compute the following:
θstdn = arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(fθ(xi), yi) (10)
θrobn = arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
‖δi‖≤
`(fθ(xi + δi), yi) (11)
Under the assumption that the supremum norm of the learned parameters is bounded by γ > 0, Chen
et al. (2020) showed that for a linear loss, the exact form of parameters found from standard and
robust empirical risk minimization are given by:
θstdn = arg min
‖θ‖∞≤γ
1
n
n∑
i=1
−yi〈θ, xi〉 = arg max
‖θ‖∞≤γ
〈θ, 1
n
n∑
i=1
yixi〉 = γ sign(
n∑
i=1
yixi) (12)
θrobn = γ sign
( n∑
i=1
yixi −  sign(
n∑
i=1
yixi)
)
(13)
To measure how much θstdn and θ
rob
n overfit, we consider the loss gap as defined in eq. (9). We denote
the loss gap between the training set and test set as r(n), and is given by:
r(n) = E
(xi,yi)∈Dtr
(x∗i ,y
∗
i )∈Dte
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
`(fθ, x
∗
i , y
∗
i )− `(fθ, xi, yi)
)]
(14)
=
1
n
E
(xi,yi)∈Dtr
(x∗i ,y
∗
i )∈Dte
[〈θ, n∑
i=1
xiyi〉 − 〈θ,
n∑
i=1
x∗i y
∗
i 〉
]
(15)
We now proceed to analyze r(n) for both θstdn and θ
rob
n , which we refer to as r
std(n) and rrob(n),
respectively 2. Full proofs of all claims are given in appendix A.
1Most relevant to our derivations on the differences between the loss gap on standard and robust models is
the work of Chen et al. (2020). In the same data setting, they show there exists cases where adversarial training
can cause the generalization error gap between an adversarially trained robust classifier and a standard classifier
to increase and subsequently decrease with more training data, and cases where more training data increases this
gap. In appendix C, we give an tighter bound for the necessary training set size required to see an increase in
this generalization error gap between standard and robust models.
2For the interested reader, we provide an interactive plot of rstd(n) and rrob(n) in https://www.desmos.
com/calculator/igkjpul0hz.
5
Training set size
Lo
ss
 g
ap Test loss > Training loss
Training loss > Test loss
(a)  = 0
Training set size
Lo
ss
 g
ap Test loss > Training loss
Training loss > Test loss
(b)  = µ
2
Training set size
Lo
ss
 g
ap Test loss > Training loss
Training loss > Test loss
(c)  = µ
Training set size
Lo
ss
 g
ap Test loss > Training loss
Training loss > Test loss
(d)  = 2µ
Training set size
Lo
ss
 g
ap Test loss > Training loss
Training loss > Test loss
(e)  = 4µ
Figure 2: How the loss gap, r(n), decreases as a function of the size of the training set, for different 
used in adversarial training, for 100d Gaussian data with µ = σ = 1.
Proposition 1. The loss gaps, rstd(n) and rrob(n), are given by:
rstd(n) = dγσ
√
2
npi
e−
nµ2
2σ2 (16)
rrob(n) = dγσ
√
2
npi
(
e
−n(+µ)2
2σ2 + e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 − e−nµ
2
2σ2
)
(17)
Proposition 2. rstd(n) is strictly decreasing in n.
Thus, proposition 2 implies that the loss gap under standard training is guaranteed to decrease as the
size of training set increases. Next, we show this also holds for adversarially robust training.
Proposition 3. For any  > 0, limn→∞ rrob(n) = 0.
Thus in the infinite data limit, the loss gap reduces to zero and it is not possible to infer membership
of a training input. From hereon in, we refer to rrob(n) parameterized by , as rrob(n, ), and analyze
rrob(n, ) for finite training set sizes, n.
Proposition 4. The following hold:
1. For 0 ≤  ≤ 2µ, there is exists no choice of n ∈ N+ such that rrob(n, ) = 0.
2. For  > 2µ, rrob(n, ) has exactly one real root, n0, that lies in the open set(
2σ2 log 2
(+2µ) ,
2σ2 log 2
(−2µ)
)
, and there exists n1 > n0, such that rrob(n1, ) is a minimum.
Proposition 4 implies the if  ≤ 2µ, the loss gap is positive for any finitely sized training set, and
so the danger of membership inference is never fully nullified. While if  > 2µ, there exists some
n0, such that for any training set larger than n0, the loss gap is negative. Of course, this doesn’t
imply we have a private model; any expected difference in loss between a training and test set implies
information has leaked, which can be exploited by an attacker. Next, we show there exists choices
of n and , such that rrob(n, ) is strictly decreasing in  for training sets smaller than n, and strictly
increasing for larger training sets.
Proposition 5. For 0 <  < µ, rrob(n, ) is decreasing in  for n < σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ) and increasing in
 for n > σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ). Furthermore, for µ <  < 2µ, r
rob(n, ) is decreasing in  for any training
set size, n.
Finally, we now show that there exists cases where rrobn > r
std
n , and cases where r
rob
n < r
std
n .
Proposition 6. The following hold:
1. For 0 <  < µ. If n > σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ), then r
rob
n > r
std
n .
2. If  = 2µ, then ∀n ∈ R+, rrobn < rstdn .
Thus, if 0 <  < µ, robust models overfit more than standard models, and so are more vulnerable to
membership attacks, and if  = 2µ, standard models overfit more than robust models, and thus robust
models are less vulnerable to membership attacks. We visualize this phenomenon in fig. 2, for a 100d
Gaussian, with µ = σ = 1. As expected, robust training with  = µ2 and  = µ (fig. 2b and fig. 2c,
respectively), leads to a larger loss gap in comparison to standard training (fig. 2a), while  = 2µ
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Figure 3: How the loss gap, r(n), decreases as a function of the size of the training set, for different 
used in adversarial training, for 100d Gaussian data with µ = σ = 1. We show both the theoretical
curve found from evaluating the closed form solution given in proposition 1 and the experimental
curve found through gradient descent.
and  = 4µ (fig. 2d and fig. 2e, respectively), leads to a smaller loss gap in comparison to standard
training.
We empirically verified these findings by training a linear classifier with a linear loss on this binary
Gaussian problem (with µ, σ, d as defined above) for 200 epochs with gradient descent and a learning
rate of 0.001. This process was repeated 10× and we present the averaged results in fig. 3. The
average empirical findings closely match the expected decrease in loss gaps in both standard and
robust training. Of course, a private model that does not achieve a small generalization error is of no
practical use; we also measured the average test accuracy of standard training and robust training (for
 = µ2 and  = 2µ) as the size of training set increases. For both standard and robust training, the
average generalization error fell to zero if n > 2. Thus, it is possible to achieve zero generalization
error while incurring a non-zero loss gap, we explore why in appendix D. This loss gap decreases as
the size of the training set increases, and consequently, privacy of the model increases if there is more
available training data. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that robust models are less private,
we have shown there exists  and n where robust models have a smaller loss gap and thus are more
private than standard models.
5 Experimental results
In section 4 we described the relationship between overfitting and robust training and how it is
dependent on the size of the training set. However this formal connection was only proved on a
simple binary classification problem. Here, we experimentally validate that these results hold for more
complex classification problems. We also empirically demonstrate the strong correlation between the
loss gap and membership attack accuracy, as suggested by eq. (9).
To expose the relationship between the loss gap and training set size, we train a ResNet-18 classi-
fier (He et al., 2016) on the CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky et al., 2009), for various training set sizes.
We then empirically show that an increase in overfitting increases membership attack accuracy. We
compare standard training with adversarially robust training with FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
with  = 8/255, and adversarially robust training with PGD (Madry et al., 2017) with  = 8/255 and
ten attack iterations. In all experiments, the initial learning rate was set to 0.1 and was annealed to
0.01 and 0.001, at epochs 100 and 150, respectively. During training, we apply data augmentation by
randomly cropping and flipping inputs.
We use a simplified version of the MALT attack as described in Sablayrolles et al. (2019) for the
membership attack. To perform the attack, the adversary first estimates the constant loss threshold, τ ,
described in section 3, as follows: The adversary trains their own model on a dataset that is different
(but from a similar distribution) from data on which the attack is mounted. The adversary then finds
the mean or median loss for both the training and test sets on which they trained and evaluated their
own model, and then finds the loss that maximizes the average distance between these two values.
7
01
2
3
4
5
Lo
ss
 g
ap
Standard
FGSM
PGD
100 200 500 1000 2000 5000 10000 20000 50000
Training set size
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
ac
cu
ra
cy
(a) Mean threshold in MALT attack.
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(b) Median threshold in MALT attack.
Figure 4: Membership attack accuracy and loss gap on CIFAR-10 as a function of the training set
size, for standard and robust models (using adversarial training with  = 8255 and using either the
FGSM or PGD attack). We use the MALT membership attack (Sablayrolles et al., 2019) with either a
mean or median decision threshold as explained in section 5.
This is then used as threshold to decide if an input was or was not part of the training set in the attack.
Sablayrolles et al. (2019) showed that this simple threshold attack improves upon other membership
attacks (Shokri et al., 2017; Yeom et al., 2018). We measure the membership accuracy on training
and test sets of equal size; because the CIFAR-10 data has 10K test set inputs, when we train with
larger training set sizes, we randomly select a subset of the training set that is equal in size to the test
set to measure membership accuracy. We repeat this process 5×, and report the average accuracy. For
experiments with smaller training and test sets, we also repeat the experiment 5× selecting random
subsets from the full training and test sets and average the results.
Figure 4 shows the average membership attack accuracy and the corresponding loss gaps for different
training set sizes. As expected from our analysis in section 4, the training set size is tightly correlated
with both membership accuracy and the loss gap – as the training set size increases both of these
values decreases. Furthermore, we expect from our analysis in section 4, that for a small  (we use
 = 8/255) in robust training, the loss gap (and thus membership accuracy) decreases at a slower rate
in comparison to standard training. This property is exactly what is exhibited in fig. 4, for small
training set sizes, the loss gap under standard training is larger or equivalent to the loss gap in robust
training, and consequently the membership accuracy is also equivalent. However as the training set
size increases, the loss gap and membership accuracy on standard models falls more rapidly than on
robust models. For completeness, we plot the membership accuracy, the loss gap, training accuracy,
and test accuracy throughout training for each training set size in appendix B.
As an aside, we found that using the mean threshold in a MALT attack performs poorly in comparison
to a median threshold, if large outliers occur when recording the threshold. For example, in standard
training with a training and test set size of 100, the median threshold is 2.7 while the mean threshold
is 0.01. The training loss values are heavily concentrated around zero, while the test loss values have
mean 3.7 but varied between 0 and 19.1. Thus a median threshold performed better that a mean
threshold since this gave no false negatives.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we formally described the trade-offs between private and robust machine learning.
In a simple data setting, we proved that a robust model can either be more or less private than a
standard model, and so there exists settings where there is no trade-off at all. We showed that this
trade-off, or lack thereof, depends entirely on the size of the training set and the strength of the
adversarial perturbations used during the training of a robust model. We then showed our findings
can be observed on more complex datasets, such as CIFAR-10.
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A Deferred proofs: Adversarial training can provably increase or decrease
overfitting
Here, we give full proofs for claims made in section 4.
Proposition 1. The loss gap, rstd(n) and rrob(n), are given by:
rstd(n) = dγσ
√
2
npi
e−
nµ2
2σ2 (18)
rrob(n) = dγσ
√
2
npi
(
e
−n(+µ)2
2σ2 + e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 − e−nµ
2
2σ2
)
(19)
Proof. Let u := 1n
∑n
i=1 xiyi, then if θ := θ
std
n , we have
rstd(n) =
1
n
E
(xi,yi)∈Dtr
(x∗i ,y
∗
i )∈Dte
[〈γ sign(u), n∑
i=1
xiyi〉 − 〈γ sign(u),
n∑
i=1
x∗i y
∗
i 〉
]
(20)
=
1
n
d∑
j=1
E
(xij ,yi)∈Dtr
(x∗ij ,y
∗
i )∈Dte
[〈γ sign(uj), n∑
i=1
xijyi〉 − 〈γ sign(uj),
n∑
i=1
x∗ijy
∗
i 〉
]
(21)
Since, given an input, xi, each dimension xij , is drawn fromN (yiµ, σ2), eq. (21) is equal to d copies
over a single dimension. In the following derivations we omit the dimensional subscript, but stress all
expectations are now taken over a single dimension:
rstd(n) =
d
n
E
(xi,yi)∈Dtr
(x∗i ,y
∗
i )∈Dte
[〈γ sign(u), n∑
i=1
xiyi〉 − 〈γ sign(u),
n∑
i=1
x∗i y
∗
i 〉
]
(22)
= dγ E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[
u sign(u)
]− dγ
n
E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[
sign(u)
] · E
(x∗i ,y
∗
i )∈Dte
[ n∑
i=1
x∗i y
∗
i
]
(23)
To solve eq. (23), we note that E[u sign(u)] = E[|u|], and:
E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[sign(u)] = P (u > 0)− P (u < 0) = 2Φ(
√
nµ
σ
)− 1 (24)
E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[|u|] = σ
√
2
npi
e−
nµ2
2σ2 − µ(1− 2Φ(√nµ
σ
)
)
(25)
E
(x∗i ,y
∗
i )∈Dte
[ n∑
i=1
x∗i y
∗
i
]
= nµ (26)
Thus for standard empirical risk minimization, θstdn , the overfitting measure defined in eq. (9) is equal
to:
rstd(n) = dγ
(
σ
√
2
npi
e−
nµ2
2σ2 − µ(1− 2Φ(√nµ
σ
)
))− dγ
n
(
nµ
(
2Φ(
√
nµ
σ
)− 1)) (27)
= dγσ
√
2
npi
e−
nµ2
2σ2 (28)
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Similarly, for robust empirical risk minimization, θrobn , the overfitting measure defined in eq. (9) is
equal to:
rrob(n) = dγ E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[u sign(u−  sign(u))]− dγµ E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[sign(u−  sign(u))] (29)
To find an analytical form of eq. (29), we must find closed form solutions to E[sign(u−  sign(u))]
and E[u sign(u−  sign(u))]:
E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[sign(u−  sign(u))] = P (u <  sign(u))− P (u >  sign(u)) (30)
= 1 + 2P (u < 0)− 2P (u < )− 2P (u < −) (31)
= 1 + 2Φ(−
√
nµ
σ
)− 2Φ(
√
n(− µ)
σ
)− 2Φ(
√
n(−− µ)
σ
)
(32)
E
u∼N (µ,σ2n )
[u sign(u−  sign(u))] =
∫ −
−∞
−u√n√
2piσ
e
−n(u−µ)2
2σ2 du+
∫ 0
−
u
√
n√
2piσ
e
−n(u−µ)2
2σ2 du (33)
+
∫ 
0
−u√n√
2piσ
e
−n(u−µ)2
2σ2 du+
∫ ∞

u
√
n√
2piσ
e
−n(u−µ)2
2σ2 du (34)
= σ
2
npi
[
e
−n(+µ)2
2σ2 + e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 − e−nµ
2
2σ2
]
(35)
− µ[− 1− 2Φ(−√nµ
σ
) + 2Φ(
√
n(− µ)
σ
) + 2Φ(
√
n(−− µ)
σ
)
]
(36)
Thus the loss gap as defined in eq. (29) is equal to:
rrob(n) = dγσ
√
2
npi
(
e
−n(+µ)2
2σ2 + e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 − e−nµ
2
2σ2
)
(37)
− dγµ
(
− 1− 2Φ(−
√
nµ
σ
) + 2Φ(
√
n(− µ)
σ
) + 2Φ(
√
n(−− µ)
σ
)
)
(38)
− dγµ
(
1 + 2Φ(−
√
nµ
σ
)− 2Φ(
√
n(− µ)
σ
)− 2Φ(
√
n(−− µ)
σ
)
)
(39)
= dγσ
√
2
npi
(
e
−n(+µ)2
2σ2 + e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 − e−nµ
2
2σ2
)
(40)
Proposition 2. rstd(n) is strictly decreasing in n.
Proof. Let rstd(n) = dγσ
√
2
npi e
−nµ2
2σ2 . Then,
∂rstd
∂n
=
−dγµ2
σ
√
2npi
e
−nµ2
2σ2 − dγσ√
2pin
3
2
e
−nµ2
2σ2 (41)
Since d, n, µ, σ, γ > 0, then ∂r
std
∂n < 0, ∀n ∈ (0,∞), and so rstd(n) is decreasing on R+. It is
also the case that limn→0+ rstd(n) =∞ as limn→0+ e
−nµ2
2σ2 = 1 and limn→0+ 1√n =∞. Similarly,
limn→∞ rstd(n) = 0 as limn→∞ e
−nµ2
2σ2 = 0.
13
Proposition 3. For any  > 0, limn→∞ rrob(n) = 0.
Proof. rrob(n) = dγσ
√
2
npi
(
e
−n(+µ)2
2σ2 + e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 − e−nµ
2
2σ2
)
, then
∂rrob
∂n
=
d√
2piσn
3
2
(
nγ
(− (+ µ)2e−n(+µ)22σ2 − (− µ)2e−n(−µ)22σ2 + µ2e−nµ22σ2 ) (42)
−γσ2(e−n(+µ)22σ2 + e−n(−µ)22σ2 − e−nµ22σ2 )) (43)
Since d, µ, σ, γ,  > 0, we have limn→∞ rrob(n) = 0, since limn→∞ e
−n(+µ)2
2σ2 =
limn→∞ e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 = limn→∞ e
−nµ2
2σ2 = 0.
Proposition 4. The following hold:
1. For 0 ≤  ≤ 2µ, there is exists no choice of n ∈ N+ such that rrob(n, ) = 0.
2. For  > 2µ, rrob(n, ) has exactly one real root, n0, that lies in the open set(
2σ2 log 2
(+2µ) ,
2σ2 log 2
(−2µ)
)
, and there exists n1 > n0, such that rrob(n1, ) is a minimum.
Proof. We have that, for a fixed  > 0, rrob(n, ) = 0 either when n = ∞ or when e−n(+µ)
2
2σ2 +
e
−n(−µ)2
2σ2 −e−nµ
2
2σ2 = 0. Thus, there exists a real root of rrob(n, ) ⇐⇒ e −n2σ2 (+2µ)+e −n2σ2 (−2µ) =
1. Let x := e
n
2σ2 . Thus, a real root exists if the following holds:
x−(+2µ) + x−(−2µ) = 1 (44)
Let h(x, ) = x−(+2µ) + x−(−2µ) − 1. We have the following limit equalities:
lim
x→∞x
−(+2µ) = 0 (45)
lim
x→∞x
−(−2µ) =

∞, if 0 <  < 2µ
1, if  = 2µ
0, if  > 2µ
(46)
lim
x→∞h(x, ) =

∞, if 0 <  < 2µ
0, if  = 2µ
−1, if  > 2µ
(47)
We also note for any  > 0, limx→0+ h(x, ) =∞. The derivative of h(x, ) is given by:
∂h
∂x
= −(+ 2µ)x−(+2µ)−1 − (− 2µ)x−(−2µ)−1 (48)
h(x, ) decreasing is equivalent to ∂h∂x < 0. In turn this implies:
∂h
∂x
< 0 =⇒ −(+ 2µ)x−(+2µ)−1 < (− 2µ)x−(−2µ)−1 (49)
=⇒ −x−4µ < − 2µ
+ 2µ
(50)
=⇒
(
2µ+ 
2µ− 
) 1
4µ
< x (51)
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Proof of (2).
Equation (51) holds ∀ ∈ (0,∞) when 2µ <  since 2µ+2µ− < 0 and x4µ > 0. Thus h(x, )
is decreasing on (0,∞) when 2µ <  and has a real root since limx→0+ h(x, ) = ∞ and
limx→∞ h(x, ) = −1.
We can find lower and upper bounds for this root when  > 2µ. Note, h(x, ) < 2x−(−2µ) − 1
when  > 2µ. So x = 2
1
(−2µ) gives an upper bound. Similarly, h(x, ) > 2x−(+2µ) − 1 when
 > 2µ, and x = 2
1
(+2µ) gives a lower bound.
Since x = e
n
2σ2 , there exists some n0 > 0, such that this n0 lies in
(
2σ2 log 2
(+2µ) ,
2σ2 log 2
(−2µ)
)
and is a
root of rrob(n0, ) = 0. Note that ∀ > 2µ, h(n, ) has a real root and limn→0+ h(n, ) = ∞ and
limn→∞ h(n, ) = 0. Thus there exists some n1 > n0 that is a minimum of h and n0 gives a trivial
lower bound.
Proof of (1).
Firstly, if  = 0 or  = 2µ, then rrob(n, 2µ) =
√
2
npiγσe
−3nµ2
2σ2 or rstd(n, 0) =
√
2
npiγσe
−nµ2
2σ2 ,
respectively. Clearly, for any finite n, rrob(n, 0) 6= 0 and rrob(n, 2µ) 6= 0.
For 0 <  < 2µ, we can show h(x, ) has no real root on (0,∞) if we show h has a global single
minimum at x0 ∈ (0,∞) and h(x0, ) > 0. The minimum of h(x, ) is given by:
∂h
∂x
= 0 =⇒ x0 =
(
2µ+ 
2µ− 
) 1
4µ
(52)
We also have limx→0+ h(x, ) = limx→∞ h(x, ) = ∞. First, we show that h(x0, ) achieves its
maximal value as  → 0+. That is, h(x0, ) is decreasing on 0 <  < 2µ. Following this we
show lim→0+ h(x0, ) > 0, and lim→2µ h(x0, ) = 0. This shows there exists no real roots if
0 <  < 2µ.
To show h(x0, ) is decreasing on 0 <  < 2µ, we show
∂h(x0,)
∂ < 0.
Note that h(x0, ) =
(
2µ−
2µ+
) +2µ
4µ
+
(
2µ−
2µ+
) −2µ
4µ
− 1, and:
∂h(x0, )
∂
=
(a
b
)−a
4µ
(
ab( ab2 +
1
b )
4µa
+
log(ab )
4µ
)
+
(a
b
) b
4µ
(−b2( ab2 + 1b )
4µa
+
log(ab )
4µ
)
(53)
where a = 2µ−  and b = 2µ+ . Then,
∂h(x0, )
∂
< 0 =⇒ a
b
(a
b
+ log(
a
b
) + 1
)
<
b
a
− log(a
b
) + 1 (54)
=⇒ a log(a
b
) + b log(
a
b
) < 0 (55)
Note eq. (55) holds since 0 < a < b and log(ab ) < 0. Hence h(x0, ) is decreasing in  and the
maximum value is found at lim→0+ h(x0, ) = lim→0+
(
2µ−
2µ+
) +2µ
4µ
+
(
2µ−
2µ+
) −2µ
4µ
− 1. Note:
lim
→0+
(
2µ− 
2µ+ 
) +2µ
4µ
= lim
→0+
(
2µ− 
2µ+ 
) −2µ
4µ
= 1 (56)
Thus lim→0+ h(x0, ) = 1, and:
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lim
→2µ
(
2µ− 
2µ+ 
) +2µ
4µ
= 0 (57)
lim
→2µ
(
2µ− 
2µ+ 
) −2µ
4µ
= 1 (58)
So lim→2µ h(x0, ) = 0, and thus h(x, ) does not have a root on x ∈ (0,∞) and  ∈ (0, 2µ).
Proposition 5. For 0 <  < 2µ, rrob(n, ) is decreasing in  for n < σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ) and increasing
in  for n > σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ).
Proof.
∂rrob(n, )
∂
=
dγ
σ
√
2n
pi
(
(µ− )e−n(µ−)
2
2σ2 − (µ+ )e−n(µ+)
2
2σ2
)
(59)
Firstly we note that if µ <  < 2µ, then ∂r
rob(n,)
∂n < 0 since µ−  < 0 and −(µ+ ) < 0. We also
note ∂r
rob(n,1)
∂ <
∂rrob(n,2)
∂ when µ < 1 < 2 < 2µ. Hence it is decreasing in  for µ <  < 2µ for
every n > 0.
For 0 <  < µ, we have ∂r
rob(n,)
∂ < 0 when:
(µ− )e−n(µ−)
2
2σ2 < (µ+ )e
−n(µ+)2
2σ2 (60)
=⇒ 2nµ
σ2
< log(
µ+ 
µ−  ) (61)
and similarly ∂r
rob(n,)
∂ > 0 when
2nµ
σ2
> log(
µ+ 
µ−  ) (62)
Thus, for 0 <  < µ, if n < σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ), then r
rob(n, ) decreases as  increases, and if n >
σ2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ), r
rob(n, ) increases as  increases.
Proposition 6. The following hold:
1. For 0 <  < µ. If n > σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ), then r
rob
n > r
std
n .
2. If  = 2µ, then ∀n ∈ R+, rrobn < rstdn .
Proof. 1. Firstly, at  = 0, rrobn = r
std
n . From proposition 5, we also have that if n >
σ2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ), then r
rob
n is increasing as → µ. It follows then that for n > σ
2
2µ log(
µ+
µ− ),
rrobn > r
std
n .
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2. For  = 2µ,
rrobn = dγσ
√
2
npi
(
e
−3nµ2
2σ2 + e
−nµ2
2σ2 − e−nµ
2
2σ2
)
(63)
= dγσ
√
2
npi
e
−3nµ2
2σ2 (64)
rstdn = dγσ
√
2
npi
e
−nµ2
2σ2 (65)
Now ∀n ∈ R+, e
−3nµ2
2σ2 < e
−nµ2
2σ2 , and so rrobn < r
std
n .
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B More experimental results
Here, we plot the membership accuracy, the loss gap, training accuracy, and test accuracy throughout
training for each training set size under the experiments defined in section 5. Figure 5 shows results
for a membership attack using a mean loss threshold, and fig. 6 results for a membership attack using
a median loss threshold.
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(i) Training set size: 50000.
Figure 5: Membership attack accuracy (using a mean threshold), loss gap, training and test accuracy
throughout training on CIFAR-10, for standard and robust models.
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(i) Training set size: 50000.
Figure 6: Membership attack accuracy (using a median threshold), loss gap, training and test accuracy
throughout training on CIFAR-10, for standard and robust models.
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C Chen et al. (2020) generalization bounds
In this section, we give an improved bound for the number of training inputs to ensure the gen-
eralization gap as defined in Chen et al. (2020) is increasing. Following this, we study how the
generalization gap is affected by label corruption.
C.1 An improved upper bound
Here, we give an improved bound to Chen et al. (2020) for the number of training inputs, n, required
to ensure the generalization gap, gn = E(x,y)∼D[y〈θstd − θrob, x〉], increases with n.
We first note that this value is governed by the function 2Φ(
√
nµ
σ )−Φ(
√
nµ
σ (1+

µ ))−Φ(
√
nµ
σ (1− µ )),
which can be written as
κ(x) = 2Φ(x)− Φ(x(1 + δ))− Φ(x(1− δ)) (66)
where x =
√
nµ
σ and δ =

µ – see Chen et al. (2020) for further details. To find if κ(x) is increasing
or decreasing we look at:
κ′(x) =
1√
2pi
e
1
2 (1+δ)
2x2(2e
1
2 δ(2+δ)x
2
+ (δ − 1)e2δx2 − 1− δ) (67)
Let ρ(x) = 2e
1
2 δ(2+δ)x
2
+ (δ − 1)e2δx2 − 1− δ, then κ′(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = ±∞ or ρ(x) = 0.
Now, ρ(x) ≥ ν(x) = (δ − 1)e2δx2 + 2eδx2 − 1− δ. Let y = ex2 , then:
ν(x) = 0 (68)
⇐⇒ (δ − 1)y2δ + 2yδ = 1 + δ (69)
⇐⇒ y = 1 or y = (1 + δ
1− δ )
1
δ . (70)
Now, y = 1 =⇒ x = 0 and y = ( 1+δ1−δ )
1
δ =⇒ x2 = 1δ log( 1+δ1−δ ). Observe that x2 achieves a
global minimum as δ → 0+, so:
lim
δ→0+
1
δ
log(
1 + δ
1− δ ) = limδ→0+
2
1− δ2 = 2 (71)
Hence x2 ≥ 2 > 32 , ∀δ > 0.
We also have:
1
δ
log(
1 + δ
1− δ ) > 2 log(
1
1− δ ) (72)
holds for 0 < δ < 0.71. Thus for δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists
√
max(
1
δ
log(
1 + δ
1− δ ), 2 log(
1
1− δ )) < x0 (73)
such that κ(x) is stricly increasing on (0, x0). It follows that gn is strictly increasing when
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n ≤ min
j∈[d],µj>0
max
(
µj

log(
µj + 
µj −  ), 2 log(
µj
µj −  )
)(σj
µj
)2
(74)
Equation (74) gives a tighter upper bound than the Chen et al. (2020) bound given by
n ≤ min
j∈[d],µj>0
max
(
3
2
, 2 log(
µj
µj −  )
)(σj
µj
)2
(75)
C.2 Chen et al. (2020) generalization bounds under label noise
Let y ∼ {±1} uniformly at random, and x ∈ Rd, where ∀j ∈ [d],
xj =
{∼ N (yµj , σ2j ), w.p ζ
∼ N (−yµj , σ2j ), w.p 1− ζ
(76)
and 1/2 < ζ ≤ 1. Then under Chen et al. (2020) the generalization gap is given by:
gn = E(x,y)∼D[y〈θstd − θrob, x〉] (77)
= 〈θstd − θrob, (2ζ − 1)µ〉 (78)
Following theorem 1 in Chen et al. (2020), gn is strictly increasing when:
n ≤ min
j∈[d],µj>0
max
(
2ζ − 1

µj log(
(2ζ − 1)µj + 
(2ζ − 1)µj −  ), 2 log(
(2ζ − 1)µj
(2ζ − 1)µj −  )
)( σj
(2ζ − 1)µj
)2
(79)
Thus the upper bound increase as ∼ O( 1ζ2 ), providing other hyperparameters are fixed.
D Bayes risk analysis
In this section, we show that a linear classifier with a linear loss can learn to separate Gaussian data
as defined section 4, with an error rate equal to the Bayes error. Let Fθ(x) = sign(fθ(x)) where
fθ(x) = 〈θ, x〉 and ` = −y〈θ, x〉.
From section 4, θstdn = γ sign(u) and in the infinite data limit sign(u) = sign(µ) = 1, and so θ
std =
γ > 0. Similarly θrobn = γ sign(u−  sign(u)), and in the infinite data limit θrob = γ sign(µ− ) > 0
if  < µ. Next, we show that any linear classifier with θ > 0 is equivalent to the Bayes classifier in
error rate.
Consider the Gaussian class-conditional densities:
P (x | y = 1) = 1
(2pi)
d
2 σ
exp (−1
2
(x− µ¯)Tσ2I(x− µ¯)) (80)
P (x | y = −1) = 1
(2pi)
d
2 σ
exp (−1
2
(x+ µ¯)Tσ2I(x+ µ¯)) (81)
(82)
where µ¯T = [µ, . . . , µ] is a d-dimensional vector. The Bayes decision rule is given by 2µ¯
T
σ2 x ≷ 0.
Note that 2µ¯
T
σ2 x > 0 ⇐⇒ x > 0, since 2µ¯
T
σ2 > 0. Clearly then, we have a decision rule that is
optimal if the sign of x is not flipped. That is, for θ ∈ Rd, sign(∑dj=1 θjxj) = sign(∑dj=1 xj).
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Note, if xj ∼ N (yµ, σ2), ∀j ∈ [d], then
∑d
j=1 xj ∼ N (ydµ, dσ2). Without loss of generality, let
y = 1, then P (
∑d
i=1 xi > 0) = Φ(
√
dµ
σ ). As d→∞, Φ(
√
dµ
σ )→ 1, and so P (
∑d
i=1 θixi > 0)→ 1
if θ > 0. Clearly then any θ > 0 gives the Bayes optimal classifier in d dimensions and the Bayes
error approaches zero as d increases.
So both θstd = γ and θrob = γ sign(µ− ) if  < µ, are classifiers with the Bayes error rate.
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